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Abstract: The decline in the working hours of general practitioners (GPs) is a key factor influencing 
access to healthcare in many countries. We investigate the effect of changes in hours worked by general 
practitioners (GPs) on waiting times in primary care using the MABEL longitudinal survey of Australian 
doctors. We estimate GP fixed effects models for waiting time and use family circumstances to 
instrument for 'W ?Ɛ hours worked.  We find that a 10% reduction in hours worked increases average 
patient waiting time by 12%. Our findings highlight the importance of GWƐ ?ůĂďŽƵƌƐƵƉƉůǇĂƚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ 
margin in determining the length of time patients must wait to see their doctor.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Primary health care is typically the first point of contact with the health care system and plays 
an important role in the diagnosis and management of patienƚƐ ? ŚĞĂůƚŚ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?  oncerns 
about access to primary health care services have been growing in many countries (Sarma, 
Thind, & Chu, 2011). In healthcare markets where there is public or private insurance and 
patients face zero or below market clearing prices, demand is rationed by waiting times.  
Consequently, waiting times are a key measure of access to health care (Siciliani & Hurst, 2003). 
Delays in receiving primary care results not only in the risk of deterioratiŽŶŽĨƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?health 
but also an increase in hospital or emergency department use (Bindman et al., 1995; Cowling et 
al., 2013; Dolton & Pathania, 2016). 
An increased prevalence of chronic diseases and ageing populations have led to an increase in 
the demand for primary care services in many OECD countries. At the same time, hours worked 
by general practitioners (GPs) have declined (Crossley, Hurley, & Jeon, 2009; Kirch & Vernon, 
2008; Sarma et al., 2011). Young doctors are working fewer hours than previous cohorts (Sarma 
et al., 2011) and  there has been a decline in the hours GPs work, both overall and in direct 
patient care for males and female GPs (H. Britt et al., 2013; Crossley et al., 2009). Reductions in 
hours worked are primarily attributed to the increasing proportion of female doctors, the 
ageing of the medical workforce and a shift of preferences over work-life balance (Crossley et 
al., 2009; Joyce, McNeil, & Stoelwinder, 2006; Kirch & Vernon, 2008; Shrestha & Joyce, 2011). 
There is currently little knowledge of how these changes in GP labour supply affect access to 
primary care in general and waiting times in particular. Medical training is a lengthy and costly 
process, and there are licensing restrictions on entry into the medical profession, so compared 
to other labour markets, supply at the extensive margin is relatively inflexible to short term 
changes in demand. As a result, reductions in working hours may have important implications 
for access to primary care services.    
In this paper, we use a longitudinal survey of Australian doctors to investigate the extent to 
which hours worked by GPs affect waiting times for appointments. Waiting times for primary 
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care are a policy concern in several OECD countries including Australia, Canada, U.K. and 
Sweden (Siciliani, Borowitz, & Moran, 2013),  but are less studied than hospital waiting times 
(Cullis & Jones, 1986; Goddard, Malek, & Tavakoli, 1995; Gravelle, Smith, & Xavier, 2003; 
Iversen, 1993; Lindsay & Feigenbaum, 1984; Martin & Smith, 1999). The limited literature 
examining the accessibility to primary care focuses on differences in access by patient age, 
gender, location and health (Kontopantelis, Roland, & Reeves, 2010; Muggah et al., 2014; 
Young, Dobson, & Byles, 2000). The few studies of primary care waiting times find that patients 
with higher income and private insurance have shorter waiting times (Roll, Stargardt, & 
Schreyögg, 2012). There is a paucity of research on how waiting times in primary care are 
affected by supply-side factors which is crucial in designing policies to ensure timely access to 
GP services. 
Our study is the first to examine the impact of hours worked by GPs on the length of time 
patients wait to see them. The key challenge in identifying the causal impact of hours worked 
by GPs on waiting times is the potential for unobserved confounders that determine both 
labour supply of GPs and their patients ? waiting time.  This is an issue because failing to account 
for confounders will lead to biased estimates of the impact of hours worked on waiting times. 
We address the presence of time-invariant ĐŽŶĨŽƵŶĚĞƌƐ ? ƐƵĐŚĂƐ'WƐ ?ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?
using a GP fixed effects (FE) approach. In order to also account for time-varying unobserved 
confounders, such as changes in patient case mix, we implement a fixed effect instrumental 
variables (FEIV) estimation strategy.  After accounting for both time invariant and time-varying 
unobserved confounding, we find that waiting times do respond to hours worked by GPs: a 10% 
decrease in the average hours worked by a GP will increase the average waiting time for the GP 
by 12%. We also find that waiting times are affected by GP attributes such as education and 
experience, local GP density, and by the socioeconomic status of the local population. 
In Section 2 we briefly set out the institutional context, provide a simple model of waiting time 
and GP labour supply, and use it to guide our estimation strategy. Section 3 describes the data 
and Section 4 provides the estimation results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the 
results and policy implications. 
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2. Methods 
2.1 General practitioners in Australia 
In Australia, GPs are the most commonly accessed primary health service and act as 
gatekeepers to specialist care. Eighty-three percent of Australians consulted a GP at least once 
in the previous 12 months in 2016-17 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017). Medicare, 
ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ?Ɛ tax-financed public insurance scheme, provides a fixed subsidy for each visit to a 
medical practitioner. GPs can charge fees at or above the rebate, which thus acts as a floor 
price. Medicare provides financial incentives to GPs to set their fees equal to the rebate for 
Commonwealth Concession Card holders and children under 16 years of age (Department of 
Human Services, 2015a), with higher incentives in regional, rural and remote areas 
(Department of Human Services, 2016).
1
 When they do so, the full cost of GP services is billed 
directly to Medicare and patients have no out of pocket costs. This practice is known as bulk-
billing. Over eighty percent of GP services are bulk-billed (Department of Health, 2017). Some 
practices bulk-bill all or most of their patients and others bulk-bill only a small proportion of 
their patients, typically in more affluent areas (Gravelle, Scott, Sivey, & Yong, 2016). Patients 
are free to visit any GP as there is no compulsory patient list or registration system. Most GPs 
work in privately owned group practices with other GPs, practice nurses and allied health 
professionals. In 2015-16, around 67 percent of GPs were working in practices of five or more 
GPs, and on average, there were 7.5 GPs per practice (H. Britt et al., 2016). 
2.2 Waiting time and GP hours worked 
                                                             
1
 Concession cards reduce the fees paid by patients for Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme prescription items, and certain 
Medicare services. There are six types of concession cards provided by the government  W Health Care Card, Commonwealth 
Seniors Health Card, Low Income Health Care Card, Pensioner Concession Card, Ex-Carer Allowance (Child) Health Care Card, 
Foster Child Care Card. For more details see: https://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/subjects/concession-and-health-
care-cards 
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We outline a simple model of the market for GP consultations.
2
 Given high bulk-billing rates, we 
assume that the GP bulk-bills all patients, who therefore face a zero price.
3
  
 
Demand for consultations with the GP is: 
                         ܦ ൌ ܦሺݓǡ ݍǢ ݔௗǡ ߳ௗሻǡܦ௪ ൏  ?ǡ ܦ௤ ൐  ?                                                               (1) 
where ݓ is waiting time and ݍ is a measure of the 'W ?ƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? ݔௗ is a vector of exogenous 
demand shifters  W such as income, education, health status and the age-distribution of the local 
population. It also includes other exogenous factors such as availability of emergency 
departments and other GPs. ߳ௗ  captures unmeasured factors that shift demand.   
On the supply side, GP works h hours per week. We assume that consultation length t is fixed 
so that the supply of consultations per week is n = h/t. The assumption that consultation length 
is fixed is reasonable in the Australian context given that most general practices follow a fixed 
appointment scheduling system where patients are booked for 15- ? ?ŵŝŶƵƚĞƐ ?ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐ
with the GPs for a standard (level B) consultation.
4
 
5
  
The GP bulk-bills all patients and so receives a fixed Medicare rebate ݉ per patient. She incurs 
costs ܿሺ݊ǡ ݍǢ ݔ௖ ǡ ߳௖ሻ where ݔ௖ are observed factors affecting costs such as the costs of nurses, 
allied health and administrative staff, and patient complexity. ߳௖ is an unobserved component. 
GP income is ݕ ൌ ݕ଴ ൅ ݉݊ െ ܿሺ݊ǡ ݍǢ ݔ௖ ǡ ߳௖ሻ, where ݕ଴ is exogenous non-work income. The 
utility of the GP is: 
                                                             
2
 See Cheraghi-Sohi et al., 2008; Gandhi, Parle, Greenfield, & Gould, 1997; Gerard, Salisbury, Street, Pope, & Baxter, 2008; 
Gravelle et al., 2003; Martin, Jacobs, Rice, & Smith, 2003; Scott, 2000; Scott & Vick, 1999; Scott, Watson, & Ross, 2003; Turner 
et al., 2007 for related literature and theoretical models. 
3
 We test the sensitivity of our results to this assumption in section 4.2. 
4
 Evidence from Australia as well as United states and Europe indicates that consultation length is determined to a large extent 
by the nature of the problems managed during the consultation and the characteristics of the patients such as age and gender 
(H. C. Britt, Valenti, & Miller, 2005; Deveugele, Derese, van den Brink-Muinen, Bensing, & De Maeseneer, 2002; Sayer et al., 
2000). It is also affected by GP characteristics such as age, gender and medical training, and by practice type and location 
(Bensing, Roter, & Hulsman, 2003; H. C. Britt et al., 2005; Deveugele et al., 2002) and can be thought as a measure of 
exogenous practice style (Schurer, Kuehnle, Scott, & Cheng, 2016). 
5
 A level B consultation is defined in the Medicare regulations as  W Professional attendance involving taking a selective history, 
examination of the patient with implementation of a management plan in relation to one or more problems OR a professional 
attendance of less than 20 minutes duration (H. Britt, Valenti, Miller, & Farmer, 2004).  Level B consultations account for about 
80% of all consultations [(H. Britt et al., 2004) (http://medicarestatistics.humanservices.gov.au/statistics/mbs_group.jsp)] 
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                                         ݑ ൌ ݑሺݕǡ ݄Ǣ ݔ௚ǡ ߳௚ሻ                                                                                      (2)     
where ݔ௚ ĚĞŶŽƚĞ'W ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐƐƵĐŚĂƐĂŐĞ ?ŐĞŶĚĞƌ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ĞƚĐ ? ?ĂŶĚ߳௚ is an 
unobserved preference shifter. The GP chooses her hours ݄ ൌ ݊ݐ of work to satisfy 
                                      ݑ௛ ൅ ݑ௬ ቀ௠௧ െ ܿ௡ ଵ௧ቁ ൌ  ?                                                                                 (3) 
and so  
                                     ݄ ൌ ݄כሺ݉ǡ ݐǡ ݍǡ ݔ௖ ǡ ݔ௚ǡ ߳௖ ǡ ߳௚ሻ                                                                           (4) 
Equivalently, given the fixed consultation length, the GP supplies consultations to the point 
where their marginal cost, including the monetary value of forgone leisure, equals marginal 
revenue (݉).     
                                               ݉ ൌ ܿ௡ െ ݐ ௨೓௨೤                                                                                            (5) 
as in the top panel in Figure 1. The supply of consultations is:  
                                     ݊ ൌ ݄כሺ݉ǡ ݐǡ ݍǡ ݔ௖ ǡ ݔ௚ǡ ߳௖ ǡ ߳௚ሻȀݐ ൌ ݊כሺ݉ǡ ݐǡ ݍǡ ݔ௖ ǡ ݔ௚ǡ ߳௖ ǡ ߳௚ሻ                        (6) 
As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1, the market clearing condition is that demand for 
consultations equals the supply of consultations which is inelastic with respect to waiting time, 
and demand adjusts via waiting time: 
                                      ܦሺݓǡ ݍǢ ݔௗǡ ߳ௗሻ െ ݊ ൌ  ?ǡ                                                                                 (7)          
Hence the equilibrium waiting time is given by: 
                        ݓ ൌ ݓሺݍǡ ݊כǢ ݔௗǡ ߳ௗሻ ൌ ݓ൫ݍǡ ݄כሺ݉ǡ ݍǢ ݐǡ ݔ௖ ǡ ݔ௚ǡ ߳௖ ǡ ߳௚ሻȀݐǢ ݔௗǡ ߳ௗ൯                        (8) 
which is decreasing in the supply of GP consultations and increasing in the quality of the GP. 
2.3 Econometric strategy  
We want to estimate the quasi-reduced form (8) for waiting time and assume a linear form for 
the waiting time for GP ݅ in year ݐ: 
                             ௜ܹ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ݄௜௧ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߛ௜ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߳௜௧                                                               (9) 
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where ݄௜௧  is the average weekly total hours worked by GP ݅ in year ݐ. ߚଵ is the coefficient of 
primary interest and is the effect of an hour change in the total hours worked by a GP on the 
average waiting time to see the GP. To capture the effect of ݔ௚ǡ ݔ௖,ݔௗ and ݍ from our 
theoretical model we include ௜ܺ௧, a vector of observed characteristics of the GP, her practice, 
and the area where it is located. ௜ܺ௧  also includes a measure of consultation length. GP fixed 
effects ߛ௜  captures time-invariant unobserved GP characteristics. ߣ௧  are year fixed effects that 
control for shocks that affect waiting times for all GPs.  
The inclusion of GP fixed effects accounts for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity that 
affects both GP ?s labour supply and waiting time. However, hours worked by GPs may also be 
correlated with unobserved time-varying confounding factors such as unobserved changes in 
patient case mix. We therefore instrument hours worked with a set of indicators capturing GP 
family type. Family circumstances, such as having young dependent children and the working 
status of the spouse have been shown in previous studies to be strongly correlated with hours 
worked (Becker, 1985; Bertrand & Hallock, 2001; Joyce, Wang, & Cheng, 2015; Schurer et al., 
2016). For these family characteristics to be valid instruments, in addition to being correlated 
with the 'W ?ƐŚŽƵƌƐǁŽƌŬed, they should not impact on the demand for GP consultations and 
hence waiting times through any mechanism other than the hours worked by GPs. 
It is unlikely that family circumstances, such as having a young child and a spouse who works 
full time, will directly affect demand for consultations with the GP and hence waiting times. 
However, there might be concern that correlation between waiting times and family 
characteristics could arise if GPs respond to demand shocks by changing their hours of work 
and those of their partner. We argue that this unlikely because decisions about labour supply 
and fertility are typically made in a life-cycle setting and based on lifetime utility (Heckman, 
1983; Killingsworth & Heckman, 1986; MaCurdy, 1981; Montgomery & Trussell, 1986). For this 
reason, short term changes in demand for GP services are unlikely to lead to significant changes 
in spousal labour supply nor are they likely to affect important life-cycle decisions such as 
having children.
6
 Evidence from studies of physicians and their partners find that life cycle 
                                                             
6
 Appendix Table A3 presents the transition probabilities of GPs moving into different family types. They are broadly in line with 
traditional life-cycle behaviour. For example:  single GPs with no children who change type are most likely to acquire a child and 
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decisions follow the traditional gendered division of labour in the household: priority is often 
given to the career of the male partner even if both partners have the same level of education  
(Gjerberg, 2003; Schurer et al., 2016; Stamm & Buddeberg-Fischer, 2011; Wang & Sweetman, 
2013). Parenthood is associated with a significant reduction in hours of work for female 
physicians, while for male physicians the effects of marriage and parenthood are much less 
evident. This is so for physician/non-physician and for physician/physician couples (Stamm & 
Buddeberg-Fischer, 2011; Wang & Sweetman, 2013). Therefore, we argue that our set of 
indicators measuring family circumstance are reasonably excluded from the waiting time 
equation as it is unlikely that demand-side shocks will materially affect the family dynamics.
7
   
We present results for OLS, OLS with GP fixed effects, IV and fixed effects IV (FEIV) models. We 
compute robust standard errors clustered on individual GP. IV and FEIV are inefficient in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity. As the Pagan and Hall test suggests that heteroscedasticity is 
present (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2007), we estimate our model using the two-step 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Data 
The data is from the Medicine in Australia: Balancing Employment and Life (MABEL) survey, an 
annual prospective cohort study of workforce participation, labour supply and its determinants 
among Australian doctors. The survey provides exceptionally rich data on doctorƐ ? ǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚ ?
qualifications, practice settings, personal characteristics, geographic location, and family 
circumstances (Joyce et al., 2010). For the first wave in 2008, a total of 54,750 doctors (the 
population of all doctors in Australia) across four broad groups within the medical workforce 
were invited to participate. The response rate was 19.36% with a total of 10,498 doctors in the 
baseline cohort, which includes 3,906 GPs, 4,597 specialists, 1,072 specialists-in-training, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
no partner in the next period, and next most likely to acquire a partner and have no dependent children. GPs with a non-
working partner and dependent children are most likely to change type to having dependent children and a partner who works 
part time.  
7
 Notice that in the theoretical model of section 2.2 that neither demand factors nor waiting time to see the GP affect the utility 
of GPs or their income. Hence, GP hours do not vary with demand shocks. Rather demand shocks lead only to changes in 
waiting time. In Figure 1, the supply curve of consultations is vertical in (w,n) space. For demand shocks to affect hours worked 
(and hence waiting times) requires that the GP cares directly about patient waiting times.  
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924 hospital non-specialists. Joyce et al. (2010) found the 2008 cohort to be representative of 
the overall doctor population with respect to age, gender, geographic location, and hours 
worked.  
In each subsequent wave of MABEL, all doctors who had previously completed a survey plus a 
cohort of new doctors were invited to participate. Attrition of the 2008 cohort in 2014 is 49.9%. 
Attrition is higher in subsequent cohorts, between 53-69%, mainly because these cohorts 
largely consisted of doctors new to clinical practice who tend to have lower response rates 
generally and are less likely to participate longitudinally. The MABEL attrition rates are   lower 
than other medical workforce surveys, both nationally and internationally (such as the US 
Community Tracking Study) (Taylor, Scott, & Leahy, 2015). 
We use data on GPs from the first seven waves of MABEL (2008-2014). The outcome of interest 
is waiting time for an appointment with the GP, measured in days.
8
 Since we use self-reported 
data on waiting times, there might be a concern regarding measurement error. We argue that, 
because there are no waiting time targets for primary care physicians in Australia, GPs have no 
systematic incentives to over-report or under-report their waiting times. Therefore, any 
measurement error in waiting times is likely to be random, so that estimates will be unbiased 
and consistent.
9
     
We use total hours worked per week as the measure of labour supply. In addition to total hours 
worked, GPs are asked to report the number of hours worked in different settings and on 
different activities.
10
 We exclude GP-year observations if the difference between the total 
number of working hours reported across different settings and the reported weekly total 
hours worked is 5 or more hours. We then exclude GP-year observations if reported weekly 
                                                             
8
 The outcome variable is based on responses to the survey question  W  ‘ǆĐůƵĚŝŶŐĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŽƌƵƌŐĞŶƚŶĞĞĚƐ ?ĨŽƌŚŽǁŵĂŶǇ
days does a patient typically have to wait for you, their preferred doctor in the practice? (Please write average number of 
ĚĂǇƐ ? ? ? 
9
 For practices with more than one D>'WƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐŽĨǁĂŝƚŝŶŐƚŝŵĞƐ “ĨŽƌĂŶǇĚŽĐƚŽƌŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ “ǁĂŝƚŝŶŐ
ƚŝŵĞ ĨŽƌ Ă ŶĞǁ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ? ĂŐƌĞĞĚ ĐůŽƐĞůǇ ? dŚĞ ƵƐƚƌĂůŝ Ŷ ƵƌĞĂƵ ŽĨ ^ƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐ WĂƚŝĞŶƚ ǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ^ƵƌǀĞǇ ĂƐŬƐ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ĂďŽƵƚ
waiting times but only for urgent appointments (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017), so patient reports cannot be compared, 
evĞŶŝŶĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞ ?ǁŝƚŚD>'WƌĞƉŽƌƚƐŽĨǁĂŝƚŝŶŐƚŝŵĞƐ “ĞǆĐůƵĚŝŶŐĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŽƌƵƌŐĞŶƚŶĞĞĚƐ ? ?  
10
 The settings in which GPs are asked to report hours worked are  W WƌŝǀĂƚĞ ŵĞĚŝĐĂů ƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ƌŽŽŵ ? ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ
centre/state-run primary care organization, public hospital, private hospital, residential/aged care facility, aboriginal health 
service, Govt. department/agency/defence forces, tertiary education institution, and other. The activities on which GPs are 
asked to report hours worked are  W Direct patient care, indirect patient care, education activities, management and 
administration, and other.  
10 
 
total hours worked are below 4 hours or exceed 75 hours. Finally, we form our baseline 
estimation sample by excluding GP-year observations if the reported waiting time for an 
appointment was greater than 30 days.
11
 
As instruments for hours worked wĞ ƵƐĞ Ă ƐĞƚ ŽĨ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌ ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ ĨŽƌ 'W ?Ɛ ĨĂŵŝůǇ
circumstances based on whether the GP has a partner, the employment status of the partner, 
the number of children and the age of the youngest child.  
The estimation sample is restricted to GPs with non-missing information on all relevant 
variables and who have at least two observations across the seven waves. The analysis sample 
size is 14,544 observations on 3,561 GPs.
12
  
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Figure 2 presents the distribution of waiting times and hours worked for the estimation sample. 
Most GPs have waiting time of less than 5 days and work between 20 to 55 hours a week.  
Table I presents the descriptive statistics for the estimation sample. The average waiting time 
for a GP is 4.02 days and the average total hours worked per week is 37.54. Half of the GPs in 
the estimation sample are women. The majority of GPs are Australian medical graduates (74%), 
their average length of a standard (level B) consultation is 15.82 minutes, and they bulk-bill 61 
percent of their patients.
13
 Most GPs are salaried or contracted employees (57%) and practice 
in cities (67%). Around 11 percent of GPs have dependent children aged under 5 years, and 50 
percent have a partner who is either not working or working part-time.   
The last two columns of Table I show that although the variation between different GPs is larger 
than variation within GPs (over time), there is still considerable within variation for waiting time 
and total hours worked to support fixed-effects analysis. There is little variation, between or 
within GPs, in the consultation length with the average varying less than 4 minutes between 
GPs and less than 2 minutes for a GP over time. This indicates that most GPs have a standard 
                                                             
11
 The distribution plots of waiting time in our data (see Figure 2) show that for most GPs the waiting times are well under 30 
days. We tested the sensitivity of the results to the waiting time cut offs defining the sample (see Appendix Table A6).    
12
 Appendix Table A1 shows the number of observations that were lost for different reasons. 
13
 The MABEL survey asks GPs to report the proportion of patients bulk-billed, while the figure of over 80% bulk-billing reported 
by Department of Health (Department of Health, 2017) is based on the proportion of GP services (not patients) bulk-billed.  
11 
 
consultation between 15-20 minutes, supporting our assumption of exogeneity of consultation 
length. 
There is nontrivial within-variation in the family characteristics we use as instruments. Appendix 
Table A3 reports GP transition probabilities between different family types. Each year, about 17 
percent of single GPs in the data become partnered. From one year to the next, about 20 
percent of GPs with a partner who is either not working or working part-time and who have a 
dependent child aged under 5 see their child turn 5 and age out of this category. Further, for a 
sizeable proportion of GPs, the partner ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ-status changes from not working to working 
part-time, or from working part-time to either not working or working full-time from one year 
to the next.  
[Figure 2 here] 
[Table I here] 
The estimation sample has broadly similar characteristics to the GP population (Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare, 2015) except that it has a larger proportion of female GPs (50% 
against 40% in the GP population) which may account for the average total hours worked per 
week being lower than the population average (37.54 against 42.7 hours in the population over 
2008-2014).
14
 
4. Regression results 
Table IIA presents results from estimating equation (9). We focus on reporting estimates of the 
coefficient of interest ߚଵ, the impact of hours worked on waiting time. The OLS estimate 
(column 1) has a positive and statistically significant coefficient on total hours worked, implying 
that a decrease in hours worked by a GP is associated with lower waiting times. However, once 
we control for GP fixed effects (column 2), the coefficient becomes statistically insignificant.
15
  
                                                             
14
 Table A2 in the appendix presents the descriptive statistics separately for female and male GPs.  
15
 Means of GP time varying variables added to a random effects specification were jointly significant at 1%, suggesting that 
fixed effects is the appropriate specification (Wooldridge, 2010).  
12 
 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table IIA present the results from IV and FEIV estimation. The C or GMM 
distance test of endogeneity confirmed the endogeneity of total hours worked in both IV and 
FEIV models, with the null of exogeneity rejected at 1% level of significance. The IV model 
(column 3) exploits the between-GP variation and has a coefficient of -0.066 on total hours 
worked, suggesting that a one hour decrease in average total hours worked per week is 
associated with a rise in average waiting time of 0.066 days, which is a 1.64% increase relative 
to the mean waiting time (4.02 days). This estimate implies that a 10% (or 3.75 hours) reduction 
in hours worked would increase the average waiting time by 6.2%. The FEIV model (column 4) is 
our preferred model since it additionally exploits within-GP variation. The estimated coefficient 
of -0.125 on total hours worked implies that a 10% reduction in average total hours worked per 
week would increase the average waiting time by 11.7%.
16
 
The instruments are stronger in the IV model (excluded instruments F statistic = 41.09 
(p<0.000), partial R
2
 = 0.048 in column 3 Table IIA) than in the FEIV model (excluded 
instruments F statistic = 17.16 (p<0.000), partial R
2
 = 0.018 in column 4 Table IIA) because 
overall variation is greater than within GP variation in the data.
17
 Both IV and FEIV models pass 
the under-identification test. Table IIB presents the results for the first stage total hours worked 
regression. As expected, having dependent children aged under 5 years is associated with a 
significant reduction in total hours worked, and this negative effect is greater for those whose 
partner works full time. 
The effect of GP, practice and area characteristics are consistent across the models. GPs who 
spend more time per patient, who graduated from an Australian medical school or have a post-
graduate qualification or Fellowship of a college, have higher waiting times. This suggests that 
patients associate these characteristics with higher quality. Tenure in practice is also found to 
be positively associated with waiting times, with waiting times increasing with tenure but at a 
                                                             
16
 We also estimated models varying the waiting time cut offs used to define the sample by (i) dropping the top and bottom 1% 
(ii) dropping observations with waiting times over 25 days (rather than 30), (iii) dropping observations with waiting times over 
15 days. The results (Appendix Table A6) are qualitatively similar to the baseline model (hours worked remain highly statistically 
significant and the instruments strong), though the effect of hours worked is reduced by about two fifths in the sample with the 
tightest (15 days) waiting time cut off.   
17
 Table A3 in the appendix shows the within-variation in instruments, presenting the transition probabilities of GPs moving into 
different family types or characteristics (i.e. our 9 instrument dummy variables) each year.   
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decreasing rate suggesting that patients prefer to consult GPs who have been in the practice for 
longer. 
GPs who are employees (contracted/salaried or working as locum) have lower waiting times 
compared to GPs who are principals or partners in the practice. The coefficient on the number 
of nurses is positive and significant, suggesting that practices with high waiting times might be 
employing more nurses.
18
 Regional and remote areas have higher waiting times compared to 
major cities. GPs in higher socio-economic areas have lower waiting times which is consistent 
with the waiting time literature (Cooper, McGuire, Jones, & Le Grand, 2009; Laudicella, Siciliani, 
& Cookson, 2012; Roll et al., 2012; Sharma, Siciliani, & Harris, 2013; Siciliani & Verzulli, 2009; 
Sudano & Baker, 2006).  
GPs located closer to emergency departments have higher waiting times. This seems counter-
intuitive since a proportion of emergency department patients have non-urgent conditions 
which could be dealt with by a GP. A possible explanation is that emergency departments are 
using triage systems where patients who are classified ĂƐ ‘ŶŽŶ-ƵƌŐĞŶƚ ?ĂƌĞƌĞ-directed from the 
ED to co-located primary care services (Carson, Clay, & Stern, 2010; Government of Western 
Australia, 2004). This might lead to increases in workload and waiting times at the co-located 
primary care practices, especially as there is no patient registration with GP practices in 
Australia, so that patients turned away from ED can go to the closest practice.
19
 
[Table IIA and IIB here] 
4.1 Alternative measures of labour supply 
We estimated models with two alternative measures of GP labour supply. First, we use hours 
worked in direct patient care as the measure of labour supply. Second, to investigate the 
                                                             
18
 This suggests that number of nurses are endogenous. As a robustness check we estimated models excluding number of 
nurses as a covariate, and the point estimates of the effect of hours worked on waiting times for all models were almost 
unchanged.   
19
 As a robustness check, we estimated the baseline models excluding the minimum distance to ED variable from the analysis 
and found the estimates were almost unchanged.   
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sensitivity of results to the specification of consultation length, we estimate models using the 
number of patients (visits) seen per week rather than hours worked.
20
  
Table III presents the results from IV and FEIV model. The baseline results (using total hours 
worked per week as the measure of labour supply) are repeated in panel C. The results using 
hours worked in direct patient care (panel A) are qualitatively similar to the baseline results, 
however, the magnitude of the effect is slightly higher, possibly because the explanatory 
variable has a slightly smaller scale. The instruments are relatively weaker for direct patient 
hours, particularly in FEIV model (panel A, column 2) perhaps because hours spent in direct 
patient care might be affected by other factors in the practice as well as by family 
circumstances.
21
  
The number of patients (visits) seen per week is negatively and significantly associated with 
waiting times for the IV model (panel B, column 1). The estimate from the IV model suggests 
that if a GP sees one patient less a week, the average waiting time would increase by 13 
minutes, slightly less than the average length of a consultation. The instruments are weak for 
the FEIV model (F = 6.428) possibly due to smaller within-GP variation in the number of patients 
seen (within-GP variation is just 23 patients compared to between-GP variation of around 53 
patients).  
 [Table III here] 
4.2 Bulk billing 
In our theoretical model, we assumed that GPs bulk-bill all patients. We examine the sensitivity 
of our results to the extent of bulk-billing by estimating models separately for the sample of 
GPs who bulk-bill 80% or more of their patients and those who bulk-bill less than 80% of their 
patients.
22
 The results are reported in panel A of Table IV. For GPs bulk-billing 80% or more of 
their patients, we still find a negative and statistically significant relationship between total 
hours worked and waiting times for the IV model (panel A, column 1), and the magnitude is 
                                                             
20
 We could not find any instrument for consultation length ሺݐሻ and hence could not formally test for endogeneity of ݐ.  
21
 Both C or GMM distance test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman test indicated that hours worked in direct patient care are 
endogenous at 5% level.   
22
 We did not restrict the sample to GPs who bulk-bill 100% percent of their patients due to very small sample size to perform 
the analysis.   
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somewhat larger than in the baseline IV results (panel D, column 1). In the FEIV model, the 
instruments are weak and estimates are imprecise perhaps because the number of GPs in the 
sub-sample is small. For GPs bulk-billing less than 80% percent of their patients we find a 
negative and statistically significant effect of total hours worked on waiting times for the FEIV 
model which is similar to that in the baseline model. As a further robustness check, we also 
estimated the baseline model for the full sample but excluding the bulk-billing variable from the 
analysis and found that results were almost unchanged (see Table A5 in the appendix). 
4.3 Female and male GPs 
Female GPs work fewer hours on average (31.64 hours) than male GPs (43.35 hours) and have 
higher average waiting times (4.28 days against 3.76 days for male GPs). Table A2 in the 
appendix presents the descriptive statistics by gender. It shows that female and male GPs are 
also different in several other characteristics controlled for in our baseline analysis. Estimating 
models separately for female and male GPs allows analysis on a more homogenous sample of 
GPs who are more likely to be similar in their unobservable characteristics which might affect 
demand for consultations and waiting times.  
Table IV panel B presents the results for female and male GPs. The coefficient on total hours 
worked is negative in both IV and FEIV models for both female and male GPs. For female GPs, 
the IV model has negative but statistically insignificant coefficient on total hours worked (-
0.042), while the FEIV model has significantly negative but smaller in magnitude (compared to 
baseline result) coefficient on total hours worked. For male GPs, the instruments are weak in 
both IV and FEIV models and hence the estimates are likely to be biased.  
Table A4 in the appendix reports the separate first stage results for female and male GPs. 
Compared to the first stage results for all GPs (Table IIB), the F-Statistics on the excluded IVs for 
female GP labour supply is similar to the baseline models but considerably smaller for male 
GPs. For female GPs, both young dependent children and working status of the spouse are 
associated with labour supply decisions. For example, having dependent children aged under 5 
years and a partner who works full time is associated with a reduction in total hours worked per 
16 
 
week of about 13 hours as compared to a single female GP without young dependent children. 
The instruments work well for female GPs.  
We find that employment status of the spouse plays a negligible role in the labour supply 
decisions of male GPs and their labour supply response to having children is also weak.
23
 
However, there is a significant negative association between male GP hours and having 
dependent children aged under 5 years and a partner who works full time compared to a single 
male GP without young dependent children.  Although the family circumstance instruments 
might be working for some male GPs in the sample, overall the instruments are weak for male 
GPs hours and hence estimates are likely to be biased.
24
  
4.4 Employee vs self-employed GPs 
Next, we examine whether the results are driven by GPs who are principals/partners or 
associates in the practice and who therefore have greater control over working hours. The 
results from separate models for GPs who are employees and for principal/partner GPs are in 
table IV panel C. Overall, the results are qualitatively similar to the baseline results. For 
employee GPs, we still find a negative and statistically significant effect of hours worked on 
waiting times for both IV and FEIV models, although the magnitude of the effect is slightly 
smaller compared to the baseline results. Due to the small sample size of self-employed GPs, 
the instruments are weak and the estimates of the effects of hours worked are imprecise. 
 
[Table IV here] 
5. Conclusion 
This study is the first to examine the extent to which the labour supply of GPs at the intensive 
margin affects access to primary care, as measured by waiting times. Our analysis takes into 
account both time-invariant and time-varying unobserved confounding factors potentially 
correlated with both hours worked by GPs and their waiting times. Controlling for demand-side 
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 A recent study on Australian GPs also found that male GPs do not significantly alter their labour supply in response to having 
children (Schurer et al., 2016)
  
24
 We were unable to find any other instruments for male GP hours and so could not further test for and correct endogeneity of 
male GP hours.  
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factors, we find that a 10% reduction in the average hours worked by a GP would increase the 
average time a patient waits to see the GP by 12%.   
Our results have implications for policy to improve access to primary care. They suggest that 
the current trend of declining working hours of GPs, primarily driven by increasing feminisation 
of medical workforce and a shift in preference for working predictable and fewer hours, is likely 
to lead to longer waiting times for patients. 
In several OECD countries, policymakers have focussed on encouraging general practices to 
provide extended working hours in an attempt to improve access. For example, in the U.K., the 
government launched seven day opening of GP practices in 2013 (Dolton & Pathania, 2016), 
and in Australia, the government provides financial incentives for GPs to offer additional after-
hours coverage to patients (Department of Human Services, 2015b).  However, evidence from 
stated preference studies suggests that financial incentives will have little impact on increasing  
the total hours worked by GPs (Broadway, Kalb, Li, & Scott, 2017; Kalb, Kuehnle, Scott, Cheng, 
& Jeon, 2015).   And in the absence of an increase in the number of GPs, reallocating the supply 
of their hours worked across the week could increase waiting times during normal weekday GP 
office hours.   
This suggests that policies which operate on the extensive margin will be required. Many 
countries, including Australia, have recruited medical graduates from overseas to increase GP 
supply in the short-term (WHO, 2010). In the long-term countries often use a mix of 
immigration and other policies aimed at improving retention and increasing domestic training, 
to address structural imbalances between supply and demand (OECD, 2008, 2016). 
A third possibility is to improve access to primary care by changing the mix of primary care 
health workers. Some studies suggest that primary care capacity could be increased by shifting 
care from doctors to nurses (Bodenheimer & Smith, 2013; Ghorob & Bodenheimer, 2012). 
However, high-quality evaluations of  the impact of nurses on primary care capacity and access 
to primary care services are still scarce (Laurant et al., 2005).   
Finally, a further policy response to increase GP labour supply could be to improve childcare 
options available to them. As demonstrated by the results for our first stage labour supply 
18 
 
models and corroborated by evidence from several OECD countries, child-bearing reduces  
ĨĞŵĂůĞ ĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ? ůĂďŽƵƌ ƐƵƉƉůǇ(British Medical Association, 2015; Cleland, Johnston, Anthony, 
Khan, & Scott, 2014; Wang & Sweetman, 2013). It is currently unclear the extent to which 
access to childcare impacts the labour supply decisions of female doctors, but this would 
appear to be an important avenue for further research. 
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Figure 1: Determination of waiting times in market for GP consultations 
 
Note. w: waiting time for consultation, n: number of consultations, m: Medicare rebate, cn: marginal cost of 
consultation, t PůĞŶŐƚŚŽĨĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ALƵh/uy: marginal rate of substitution of hours worked for income (marginal 
compensation required for an hour work), D(w,·): demand for consultations. Top panel: hours worked determined 
by full marginal cost  Wt(uh/uy) of a consultation and marginal revenue.  Bottom panel: waiting time determined by 
demand and inelastic supply of consultations. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of hours worked and waiting times for GPs 
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Table I: Descriptive statistics for estimation sample, pooled across years (2008-2014) 
  Overall S D S D 
Variables Mean S D Min Max Between Within 
       
Waiting time for you in practice 4.02 5.60 0 30 4.99 2.72 
Total hours worked per week 37.54 13.60 4 75 12.53 5.26 
Hours worked in direct patient care per week  31.18 12.18 4 75 11.24 4.93 
No. of patients (visits) seen per week 110.50 57.02 10 300 52.74 23.01 
       
Personal characteristics  
     
Female 0.50 0.50 0 1 0.50 0.00 
Age: Under 35 0.09 0.28 0 1 0.30 0.12 
Age: 35-39 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.27 0.18 
Age: 40-44 0.12 0.33 0 1 0.26 0.21 
Age: 45-49 0.16 0.36 0 1 0.28 0.24 
Age: 50-54 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.29 0.26 
Age: 55-59 0.16 0.36 0 1 0.27 0.24 
Age: 60-64 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.23 0.20 
Age: 65 or over  0.09 0.29 0 1 0.27 0.12 
Length of std. private consultation  15.82 3.99 5 30 3.61 1.88 
Australian medical graduate 0.74 0.44 0 1 0.45 0.00 
Post graduate qualification/Fellowship 0.61 0.49 0 1 0.46 0.16 
       
Practice characteristics  
     
Tenure in practice (years) 9.00 9.81 0 61 9.16 3.21 
Total no. of GPs in the practice 7.76 4.17 1 25 3.82 1.92 
% of patients bulk-billed 60.56 30.15 0 100 27.78 12.29 
No. of nurses in the practice 2.39 1.90 0 10 1.70 0.92 
No. of allied health prof. \& administrative staff in 
practice 
6.18 4.20 0 30 3.59 2.38 
Employment type: Principal or partner 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.41 0.18 
Employment type: Associate 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.24 0.19 
Employment type: Salaried or Contracted employee 0.57 0.50 0 1 0.44 0.23 
Employment type: Locum or other 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.15 0.13 
       
Area characteristics  
     
Location (ASGC): City 0.67 0.47 0 1 0.46 0.13 
Location (ASGC): Regional 0.31 0.46 0 1 0.45 0.13 
Location (ASGC): Remote 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.16 0.05 
SEIFA Index 1016 74.44 669.50 1213.92 70.92 23.26 
Percent of population under 5 yrs of age 6.03 1.40 0.43 13.34 1.32 0.52 
Percent of population above 65 yrs of age 13.89 4.96 0.18 43.37 4.71 1.67 
Min. distance to emergency department 4.62 3.53 1 19 3.29 1.29 
Ratio of GPs to population (per 1,000) 1.40 0.83 0.07 10.10 0.72 0.39 
       
Instruments  
     
Single 0.08 0.28 0 1 0.24 0.14 
No dep. children, partner doesn't work or works p/t 0.19 0.39 0 1 0.34 0.19 
No dep. children, partner works full time 0.11 0.32 0 1 0.28 0.18 
ĞƉ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶA䜀  ? ?ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬ 0.03 0.16 0 1 0.13 0.10 
ĞƉ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶA䜀  ? ?ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌǁŽƌŬƐpart time 0.03 0.16 0 1 0.12 0.11 
ĞƉ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶA䜀  ? ?ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌǁŽƌŬƐĨƵůůƚŝŵĞ 0.05 0.21 0 1 0.17 0.12 
Dep. children > 5, partner doesn't work or works p/t 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.37 0.24 
Dep. children > 5, partner works full time 0.22 0.42 0 1 0.36 0.23 
Single with dep. children 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.16 0.10 
 
Table IIA: Waiting time regression results for all GPs 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent variables OLS GP fixed effects IV FEIV 
  
       
 
Total hours worked per week 0.012** (0.005) 0.006 (0.006) -0.066** (0.026) -0.125*** (0.043) 
Personal characteristics 
 
       
Female 0.872*** (0.172) 
 
 
0.217 (0.299) 
 
 
Age: 35-39 [Excl: Under 35 years] 0.618*** (0.202) 0.293 (0.278) 0.499** (0.228) 0.162 (0.280) 
Age: 40-44 0.897*** (0.232) 0.297 (0.388) 0.741*** (0.267) 0.372 (0.389) 
Age: 45-49 0.969*** (0.226) 0.233 (0.453) 0.998*** (0.246) 0.637 (0.469) 
Age: 50-54 0.963*** (0.225) 0.163 (0.496) 1.134*** (0.246) 0.709 (0.527) 
Age: 55-59 0.567** (0.233) -0.293 (0.547) 0.751*** (0.248) 0.319 (0.588) 
Age: 60-64 0.427* (0.246) -0.466 (0.602) 0.410 (0.280) -0.106 (0.628) 
Age: 65 or over  0.024 (0.288) -0.783 (0.695) -0.662 (0.415) -0.900 (0.711) 
Length of std. private consultation (mins) 0.153*** (0.015) 0.096*** (0.018) 0.253*** (0.020) 0.081*** (0.019) 
Australian medical graduate 1.176*** (0.156) 
 
 
0.740*** (0.171) 
 
 
Post graduate qualification/Fellowship 0.716*** (0.128) 0.557*** (0.192) 0.698*** (0.162) 0.454** (0.204) 
Practice characteristics 
 
       
Tenure in practice (years) 0.158*** (0.017) 0.136*** (0.023) 0.180*** (0.021) 0.149*** (0.024) 
Tenure in practice (years) squared -0.003*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) 
Total no. of GPs in the practice 0.036** (0.017) 0.005 (0.020) 0.063** (0.024) -0.004 (0.021) 
% of patients bulk-billed 0.001 (0.002) 0.004 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 
No. of nurses 0.164*** (0.037) 0.115*** (0.043) 0.226*** (0.054) 0.117*** (0.044) 
No. of allied health prof. & admin. Staff 0.003 (0.012) -0.011 (0.013) 0.055*** (0.021) -0.013 (0.013) 
Associate [Excl: Principal/partner] -0.200 (0.183) -0.120 (0.205) -0.684** (0.333) -0.403* (0.234) 
Salaried or Contracted employee -0.733*** (0.162) -0.446** (0.208) -1.706*** (0.304) -0.866*** (0.260) 
Locum or other -0.877*** (0.208) -0.585** (0.247) -2.102*** (0.390) -1.024*** (0.302) 
Area level characteristics 
 
       
Location (ASGC): Regional [Excl: City] 1.800*** (0.174) 1.623*** (0.287) 1.937*** (0.215) 1.730*** (0.299) 
Location (ASGC): Remote  1.558*** (0.423) 1.123** (0.514) 2.188*** (0.647) 1.516** (0.607) 
SEIFA Index -0.006*** (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) -0.010*** (0.001) -0.003* (0.002) 
Percent of population under 5 yrs of age -0.053 (0.047) -0.044 (0.062) -0.037 (0.063) -0.039 (0.066) 
Percent of population above 65 yrs of age 0.058*** (0.015) 0.047** (0.024) 0.060*** (0.016) 0.049** (0.025) 
Min. distance to emergency department -0.056*** (0.018) -0.043* (0.025) -0.088*** (0.024) -0.057** (0.028) 
Ratio of GPs to population (per 1,000) -0.179** (0.070) -0.111 (0.086) -0.341*** (0.091) -0.082 (0.087) 
 
        
Year fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
GP fixed effects No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
 
        
Observations 14,544 
 
14,544 
 
14,544 
 
14,544 
 
R-squared 0.185 
 
0.031 
 
0.164 
 
- 
 
Number of GPs 3,561 
 
3,561 
 
3,561 
 
3,561 
 
First Stage statistics 
 
       
F-stat of excluded instruments [P-value] 
 
   
41.09 [0.000] 
 
17.16 [0.000] 
 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments 
 
   
0.048 
 
0.018 
 
Underidentification test P-value 
 
   
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
Endogeneity test P-value 
    
0.000 
 
0.001 
 
Notes: Robust std. errors clustered on GP in parenthesis. Coefficients for year effects and constant are omitted. ***,**,* 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.   
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Table IIB: First stage results ʹ Effect of family characteristics on total hours worked per week 
  All GPs 
Independent variables IV FEIV 
  (1) (2) 
 
    
Instruments 
 
   
No dep. children, partner doesn't work or works part time [Excl: 
Single GP] 
-3.268*** (0.684) -0.253 (0.436) 
No dep. children, partner works full time -0.793 (0.668) 1.295*** (0.442) 
ĞƉ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶA䜀  ? ?ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬ -1.760* (0.897) -1.282* (0.689) 
ĞƉ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶA䜀  ? ?ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌǁŽƌŬƐƉĂƌƚƚŝŵĞ -4.984*** (0.970) -2.577*** (0.647) 
ĞƉ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶA䜀  ? ?ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌǁŽƌŬƐĨƵůůƚŝŵĞ -11.144*** (0.779) -5.494*** (0.564) 
Dep. children > 5, partner doesn't work or works part time -1.583*** (0.602) -0.883** (0.406) 
Dep. children > 5, partner works full time -5.566*** (0.610) -1.811*** (0.432) 
Single, Have dep. children  -1.611* (0.879) -1.015 (0.674) 
 
    
Covariates Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
GP fixed effects  No 
 
Yes 
 
 
    
Observations 14,544 
 
14,544 
 
Centered R2 0.3857 
 
0.0723 
 
Number of GPs 3,561 
 
3,561 
 
 
    
Notes: Robust std. errors clustered on GP in parenthesis. Coefficients for covariates, year effects and constant are omitted. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Table III: Waiting time regression results using alternative measures of labour supply 
  (1) (2) 
Measure of labour supply IV FEIV 
      
 
A: Hours worked in direct patient care per week -0.078** (0.032) -0.196*** (0.062) 
 [F = 34.47] [F = 9.441] 
 
    
B: No. of patients (visits) seen per week -0.028*** (0.010) -0.045** (0.018) 
 [F = 15.44] [F = 6.428] 
 
    
C: Baseline results: Total hours worked per week -0.066** (0.026) -0.125*** (0.043) 
 [F = 41.09] [F = 17.16] 
  
    
Notes: Complete tables are available on request. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. F-statistic for the excluded 
instruments in the first stage are in square brackets. 
 
 
Table IV: Robustness checks on sub-samples  
 
(1) (2) 
Sub-samples IV FEIV 
 
    
A: Bulk-billing  
   
80% or more patients bulk-billed -0.097** (0.047) -0.120 (0.138) 
(N=5,212, n=1,789) [F = 12.69] [F= 4.31] 
 
    
Less than 80% patients bulk-billed -0.044 (0.027) -0.129*** (0.044) 
(N=9,332, n=2,689) [F = 33.67] [F= 10.94] 
 
    
B: Female and male GPs  
   
Female GPs -0.042 (0.026) -0.096** (0.041) 
(N=7,211, n=1,786)  [F = 42.85] [F = 14.74] 
 
    
Male GPs -0.090 (0.084) -0.162 (0.141) 
(N=7,333, n=1,775) [F = 4.247] [F = 2.794] 
 
    
C: Employed and self-employed GPs  
   
Employed GPs  -0.061** (0.024) -0.074** (0.038) 
(N=8,874, n=2,586) [F = 42.04] [F = 13.91] 
 
    
Self-employed GPs (principals, partners or associates) -0.085 (0.071) -0.222* (0.128) 
(N=5,670, n=1,664) [F = 5.06] [F = 3.36] 
 
    
D: Baseline results  
   
Full estimation sample -0.066** (0.026) -0.125*** (0.043) 
(N=14,544, n=3,561) [F = 41.09] [F = 17.16] 
 
    
Notes: The table presents the coefficients on the total hours worked per week. In FEIV models, the number of observations 
were lesser due to the exclusion of singleton groups when sample is restricted to GPs bulk-billing 80% or more patients (430 
observations dropped), bulk-billing less than 80% patients (393 observations dropped), and when sample is divided into 
employed (246 observations dropped) and self-employed GPs (310 observations dropped). Complete tables are available on 
request. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. F-statistic for the excluded instruments in first stage are in square 
brackets.
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Table A1: Sample selection 
Total observations in MABEL waves 1-7 24,609 
Dropped 10,065 
Final sample 14,544 
Reasons for dropping:   
Missing information on total hours worked 997 
Missing information on waiting time 1,708 
Conflicting information on reported working hours  970 
Reports weekly total hours more than 75 or less than 4 299 
Reports average waiting time greater than 30 days  330 
Missing information on covariates that enter waiting time equation or family characteristics 
variables (used to construct instruments)  
4,196 
GPs having two or fewer observations across seven waves 1,565 
TOTAL  10,065 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Table A2: Descriptive statistics by gender, pooled across years (2008-2014) 
  Female GPs Male GPs  
  (N=7,211, n=1,786) (N=7,333, n=1,775) 
Variable Mean S D S D S D Mean S D S D S D 
    Overall Between Within   Overall Between Within 
 
        
Waiting time for you in practice 4.28 5.55 4.80 2.83 3.76 5.64 5.16 2.61 
Total hours worked per week 31.64 12.20 11.18 5.11 43.35 12.35 11.21 5.40 
Hours worked in direct patient care per week  25.79 10.63 9.76 4.54 36.47 11.26 10.21 5.29 
No. of patients (visits) seen per week 85.38 45.41 41.13 20.37 135.21 56.47 51.95 25.33 
 
        
Personal characteristics  
       
Age: Under 35 0.12 0.33 0.34 0.14 0.05 0.22 0.23 0.10 
Age: 35-39 0.14 0.34 0.29 0.21 0.08 0.26 0.23 0.15 
Age: 40-44 0.15 0.36 0.28 0.23 0.10 0.29 0.24 0.19 
Age: 45-49 0.17 0.38 0.29 0.25 0.14 0.35 0.27 0.23 
Age: 50-54 0.18 0.38 0.28 0.26 0.18 0.39 0.29 0.26 
Age: 55-59 0.13 0.34 0.25 0.22 0.18 0.39 0.29 0.26 
Age: 60-64 0.08 0.26 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.33 0.25 0.22 
Age: 65 or over  0.03 0.18 0.16 0.09 0.14 0.35 0.33 0.14 
Length of std. private consultation  16.89 4.16 3.70 2.05 14.76 3.52 3.19 1.70 
Australian medical graduate 0.78 0.42 0.44 0.00 0.71 0.45 0.47 0.00 
Have post graduate qualification/Fellowship 0.64 0.48 0.45 0.18 0.58 0.49 0.47 0.15 
 
        
Practice characteristics  
       
Tenure in practice (years) 7.02 7.82 7.17 2.73 10.94 11.09 10.46 3.62 
Total no. of GPs in the practice 7.99 4.02 3.69 1.86 7.53 4.30 3.94 1.97 
% of patients bulk-billed 56.10 30.51 27.84 12.89 64.94 29.15 27.12 11.67 
No. of nurses in the practice 2.34 1.86 1.65 0.93 2.45 1.94 1.76 0.90 
No. of allied health prof. & administrative staff in 
practice 
6.26 4.10 3.45 2.36 6.09 4.30 3.71 2.39 
Employment type: Principal or partner 0.16 0.36 0.33 0.15 0.41 0.49 0.44 0.21 
Employment type: Associate 0.09 0.29 0.22 0.18 0.12 0.32 0.26 0.19 
Employment type: Salaried or Contracted employee 0.71 0.45 0.39 0.23 0.43 0.50 0.45 0.23 
Employment type: Locum or other 0.04 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.04 0.20 0.17 0.12 
 
        
Area characteristics  
       
Location: City 0.71 0.45 0.44 0.14 0.62 0.49 0.47 0.13 
Location: Regional 0.27 0.44 0.43 0.14 0.35 0.48 0.46 0.13 
Location: Remote 0.02 0.15 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.18 0.18 0.05 
SEIFA Index 1028.62 74.51 71.01 25.19 1003.77 72.29 68.86 21.19 
Percent of population under 5 yrs of age 5.98 1.42 1.34 0.56 6.08 1.37 1.29 0.48 
Percent of population above 65 yrs of age 13.52 4.78 4.47 1.78 14.26 5.10 4.90 1.55 
Min. distance to emergency department 4.62 3.44 3.16 1.37 4.62 3.62 3.41 1.19 
Ratio of GPs to population (per 1,000) 1.47 0.89 0.76 0.41 1.32 0.77 0.67 0.37 
 
        
Instruments  
       
Single 0.10 0.30 0.27 0.15 0.07 0.25 0.22 0.14 
No dep. children, partner doesn't work or works part 
time 
0.10 0.30 0.26 0.15 0.28 0.45 0.39 0.22 
No dep. children, partner works full time 0.14 0.35 0.31 0.20 0.08 0.28 0.23 0.17 
Dep. ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶA䜀  ? ?ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬ 0.02 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.19 0.16 0.12 
ĞƉ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶA? ? ?ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌǁŽƌŬƐƉĂƌƚƚŝŵĞ 0.02 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.18 0.14 0.12 
ĞƉ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶA? ? ?ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌǁŽƌŬƐĨƵůůƚŝŵĞ 0.08 0.28 0.23 0.16 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.07 
Dep. children > 5, partner doesn't work or works part 
time 
0.13 0.34 0.28 0.20 0.37 0.48 0.41 0.26 
Dep. children  > 5, partner works full time 0.35 0.48 0.40 0.26 0.10 0.30 0.25 0.18 
Single, Dep. children  0.06 0.23 0.20 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.11 0.09 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Transition probabilities of GPs moving into different family types (instrument categories) 
each year 
          Instruments           
Instruments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
   
        
  
1 71.22 8.31 8.68 0.12 0.5 0.37 4.96 3.47 2.36 100 
2 2.9 86.06 5.46 0.06 0.11 0.11 4.66 0.34 0.28 100 
3 5.48 13.03 69.88 0.19 0.09 0.57 3.59 6.99 0.19 100 
4 1.33 0.66 0 57.81 14.95 3.32 19.6 1.66 0.66 100 
5 2.09 1.05 0 10.8 50.17 8.71 20.56 5.23 1.39 100 
6 1.5 0 0.75 2.81 4.87 64.61 2.06 23.03 0.37 100 
7 1.58 7.94 0.45 0.24 0.2 0.08 80.85 7.73 0.93 100 
8 1.74 1.05 5.86 0.05 0.09 0.27 9.19 80.6 1.14 100 
9 11.5 0.27 1.87 0 0.27 0.53 4.55 6.15 74.87 100 
   
        
  
Total 8.4 19.88 10.8 2.36 2.35 4.1 25.62 22.78 3.7 100 
Notes: The rows reflect the values in period ሺݐሻand the columns reflect the values in period ሺݐ ൅  ?).  
Key 
Number Description 
1 Single GP 
2 No dep. children, partner doesn't work or works part time 
3 No dep. children, partner works full time 
4 Dep. ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶA䜀  ? ?ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬ 
5 ĞƉ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶA䜀  ? ?ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌǁŽƌŬƐƉĂƌƚƚŝŵĞ 
6 ĞƉ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶA䜀  ? ?ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌǁŽƌŬƐĨƵůůƚŝŵĞ 
7 Dep. children > 5, partner doesn't work or works part time 
8 Dep. children > 5, partner works full time 
9 Single, Dep. children  
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Table A4: First stage results by genderʹ Effect of family characteristics on total hours worked per week 
  Female GPs Male GPs 
Independent variables IV FEIV IV FEIV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
        
Instruments 
        
No dep. children, partner doesn't work or works part time [Excl: 
Single GP] 
-2.626*** (1.003) -0.260 (0.688) -1.341 (0.928) 0.203 (0.550) 
No dep. children, partner works full time -1.642* (0.867) 1.360** (0.638) 0.462 (0.928) 1.103* (0.597) 
ĞƉ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶA? 5, partner doesn't work -2.249 (1.762) -1.607 (1.250) -0.334 (1.078) -0.853 (0.788) 
Dep. children A䜀  ? ?ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌǁŽƌŬƐƉĂƌƚƚŝŵĞ -8.988*** (1.523) -4.635*** (1.075) -1.978* (1.190) -1.118 (0.773) 
Dep. children A䜀  ? ?ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌǁŽƌŬƐĨƵůůƚŝŵĞ -12.958*** (0.894) -6.552*** (0.733) -0.811 (2.149) -3.083*** (0.914) 
Dep. children > 5, partner doesn't work or works part time -3.434*** (0.854) -1.760*** (0.648) 1.214 (0.832) 0.001 (0.513) 
Dep. children > 5, partner works full time -8.251*** (0.770) -3.054*** (0.607) 2.043** (0.941) 0.490 (0.596) 
Single, Have dep. children  -3.349*** (1.021) -1.633* (0.876) 1.779 (1.674) 0.037 (1.082) 
 
        
Covariates Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
GP fixed effects  No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
 
        
Observations 7,211 
 
7,211 
 
7,333 
 
7,333 
 
Centered R2 0.2939 
 
0.0835 
 
0.2731 
 
0.0893 
 
Number of GPs 1,786 
 
1,786 
 
1,775 
 
1,775 
 
 
        
Important statistics 
        
F-stat of excluded instruments [P-value] 42.85 [0.000] 
 
14.74 [0.000] 
 
4.247 [0.000] 
 
2.794 [0.004] 
 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments 0.100 
 
0.038 
 
0.011 
 
0.003 
 
Underidentification test P-value 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.023 
 
Endogeneity test P-value 0.007 
 
0.009 
 
0.170 
 
0.216 
 
Notes: Robust std. errors clustered on GP in parenthesis. Coefficients for covariates, year effects and constant are omitted ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively 
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Table A5: Waiting time regression results, excluding bulk-billing variable from covariates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent variables OLS GP fixed effects IV FEIV 
                
Total hours worked per week 0.012*** (0.005) 0.006 (0.006) -0.066** (0.026) -0.124*** (0.043) 
         
Personal characteristics         
Female 0.870*** (0.172) -  0.216 (0.300) -  
Age: 35-39 [Excl: Under 35 years] 0.616*** (0.202) 0.272 (0.277) 0.499** (0.228) 0.146 (0.280) 
Age: 40-44 0.896*** (0.232) 0.272 (0.386) 0.741*** (0.267) 0.351 (0.387) 
Age: 45-49 0.968*** (0.226) 0.209 (0.451) 1.000*** (0.245) 0.617 (0.467) 
Age: 50-54 0.962*** (0.225) 0.139 (0.493) 1.136*** (0.245) 0.689 (0.524) 
Age: 55-59 0.567** (0.233) -0.316 (0.545) 0.752*** (0.248) 0.300 (0.585) 
Age: 60-64 0.428* (0.246) -0.486 (0.600) 0.412 (0.279) -0.122 (0.626) 
Age: 65 or over  0.027 (0.288) -0.803 (0.694) -0.656 (0.412) -0.913 (0.709) 
Length of std. private consultation (min) 0.153*** (0.015) 0.095*** (0.018) 0.253*** (0.020) 0.081*** (0.019) 
Australian medical graduate 1.169*** (0.154) -  0.736*** (0.171) -  
Have post graduate qualification/Fellowship 0.716*** (0.128) 0.567*** (0.193) 0.698*** (0.162) 0.464** (0.204) 
         
Practice characteristics         
Tenure in practice (years) 0.158*** (0.017) 0.137*** (0.023) 0.180*** (0.021) 0.150*** (0.024) 
Tenure in practice (years) squared -0.003*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) 
Total no. of GPs in the practice 0.036** (0.017) 0.004 (0.020) 0.063** (0.024) -0.005 (0.021) 
No. of nurses in the practice 0.164*** (0.037) 0.116*** (0.043) 0.226*** (0.054) 0.118*** (0.044) 
No. of allied health prof. & admin. staff in practice 0.003 (0.012) -0.011 (0.013) 0.055*** (0.021) -0.013 (0.013) 
Employment type: Associate [Excl: Principal or partner] -0.201 (0.183) -0.123 (0.205) -0.685** (0.333) -0.405* (0.234) 
Employment type: Salaried or Contracted employee -0.732*** (0.162) -0.447** (0.208) -1.705*** (0.304) -0.864*** (0.260) 
Employment type: Locum or other -0.876*** (0.208) -0.581** (0.247) -2.102*** (0.390) -1.017*** (0.301) 
         
Area level characteristics         
Location (ASGC): Regional [Excl: City] 1.795*** (0.172) 1.597*** (0.286) 1.931*** (0.210) 1.709*** (0.297) 
Location (ASGC): Remote  1.553*** (0.423) 1.119** (0.512) 2.181*** (0.645) 1.510** (0.604) 
SEIFA Index -0.007*** (0.001) -0.003* (0.001) -0.010*** (0.001) -0.003** (0.002) 
Percent of population under 5 yrs of age -0.052 (0.047) -0.043 (0.062) -0.036 (0.064) -0.039 (0.066) 
Percent of population above 65 yrs of age 0.058*** (0.015) 0.048** (0.024) 0.060*** (0.016) 0.050** (0.025) 
Min. distance to emergency department -0.056*** (0.018) -0.042 (0.025) -0.088*** (0.024) -0.056** (0.028) 
Ratio of GPs to population (per 1,000) -0.180*** (0.070) -0.117 (0.086) -0.342*** (0.091) -0.087 (0.087) 
         
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
GP fixed effects No  Yes  No  Yes  
         
Observations 14,544  14,544  14,544  14,544  
R-squared 0.185  0.030  0.164  -  
Number of GPs 3,561  3,561  3,561  3,561  
         
First Stage statistics         
F-stat of excluded instruments [P-value]     40.84 [0.000]  17.16 [0.000]  
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments     0.048  0.018  
Underidentification test P-value     0.000  0.000  
Endogeneity test P-value         0.000   0.001   
Notes: Robust std. errors clustered on GP in parenthesis. Coefficients for covariates, year effects and constant are omitted ***, 
**, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Table A6: Sensitivity to different waiting time cut-offs 
 
(1) (2) 
Waiting time cut-offs IV FEIV 
    
 
Dropping GP-year observations in top and bottom 1% of waiting time distribution -0.073** (0.029) -0.178*** (0.051) 
(N=14,697) [F = 41.05] [F = 16.89] 
 
    
Dropping GP-year observations if waiting time > 25 days (N=14,287) -0.062*** (0.021) -0.129*** (0.037) 
(3% of non-missing observations on waiting time dropped) [F = 40.15] [F = 16.79] 
 
    
Dropping GP-year observations if waiting time > 15 days (N=13,781) -0.047*** (0.016) -0.074*** (0.028) 
(6.2 % of non-missing observations on waiting time dropped) [F = 38.86] [F = 16.47] 
 
    
Baseline: Dropping GP-year observations if waiting time > 30 days (N=14,544) -0.066** (0.026) -0.125*** (0.043) 
(1.6% of non-missing observations on waiting time dropped) [F = 41.09] [F = 17.16] 
     
Notes: The table only presents the coefficients on the total hours worked per week. In all models the outliers/cut-offs for total 
hours worked is defined as the baseline specification, i.e. GP-year observations were excluded if total hours worked per week 
were below 4 hours or greater than 75 hours. Complete tables are available on request. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10%. F-statistic for the excluded instruments in the first stage are in square brackets. 
 
